Ontological Argument debunked.

I am going to put this argument to bed here. So, we must first give a definition.

Maximally great being- a being in which none could be greater.

Now we have the actual argument, which I will present in its entirety and then break down the premises to show how it works. As presented by Plantinga:

1) It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2) If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3) If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then a maximally great being exists in every possible world.
4) If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, a maximally great being exists in the actual world.
5) If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6) Therefore maximally great being exists.

Ok so premise 1: 1) It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

It is important to note, that this is actual possibility, not perceived possibility. This will become important later. To explain this a little, it is possible that something could be perceived to be possible yet in actuality it is impossible. Therefore in order for this to work we need to know it is actually possible, or at least say it is likely to be possible. As of right now that seems ok.

Now onto premise 2) If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

Possibility of existence naturally implies that in some possible world it exists. This may not be the real world but if it didn't exist in some possible world then it would be impossible, so this premise is good.

Onto Premise 3) If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then a maximally great being exists in every possible world.

The logic behind this appears to be that if a being could exist in all possible worlds then it would be greater then a being that only exists in some possible worlds. While I would agree, we could dispute that it is logically possible for a being to exist in every possible world. After all the point of changing god from the omni god to maximally great was to avoid paradoxes. Yet alas I will grant this premise. This means that the only way a maximally great being exists is if this is the set of possible universes:(M=Maximally great being)

(M.M.M,M,M,M,M......)

in other words you could not have these sets:NM( no maximally great being)

(M,M,NM,M,NM........)
(NM,M,NM,NM,NM,NM......)

or any variation that combines the two.

So now, we have a updated definition of Maximally great being:
Maximally great being: a being in which none could be greater that exists in every possible world.

We move onto premise 4) If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, a maximally great being exists in the actual world.

This is pretty basic, the actual world is a possible world so its obvious that if this being exists in every possible world it exists in the actual world.

Premise 5) If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

Same thing here, anything that exists in the actual world exists. Obvious, no complaints.

6) Therefore maximally great being exists.

So obviously the conclusion follows if we get up to this point with all arguments being sound.

That is how the Ontological argument works;

This can appear very appealing to a theist and they think they have their proof. A closer look and we can see a problem. As Plantinga himself proposes we could define No Maximality. No Maximality is defined as: the property of being such that there is no maximally great being. Ok so onto the anti-ontological argument.

1. It is possible that a "no maximality" exists.
2. If it is possible that "no maximality exists", then a "no Maximality" exists in some possible world.
3. If a "no maximality" exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a "no maximality" exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. If a "no maximality" exists in the actual world, then no maximality exists.
6. Therefore, a "no maximality" exists.

Ok, so lets see if this argument works the same way.

1. It is possible that a "no maximality" exists.

Again, in order to know for sure that no maximality exists it must be actual possibility, not perceived possibility.

Premise 2. If it is possible that "no maximality exists", then a "no Maximality" exists in some possible world.

Same reasoning as for the original argument, if a no maximality possibly exists, that would mean it exists in some possible universe, otherwise it would be impossible.

Ont Premise 3. If a "no maximality" exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

This is where the theist, usually whines and complains that no maximality has no requirement to exist in every possible universe. But, alas the theist has defined Maximally great being in such a way that yes it does. Once you have the first possible universe in your set as this:

(NM)

We have already established through the theists own logic that a maximally great being would not exist in a set of universes that has a universe that contains its opposite. So therefore the only universe "No Maximality" can exist in is :

(NM,NM,NM,NM,NM,NM,NM.....)

So based on the theists own reasoning and a little bit of reductio ad absurdum logic, which is as follows: A maximally great being cannot exist in all possible universes, yet not exist in a possible universe. That is breaking the law of non-contradiction.

Onto Premise 4. If a "no maximality" exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

Same reasoning as for the previous argument.

Premises: 5. If a "no maximality" exists in the actual world, then no maximality exists.
6. Therefore, a "no maximality" exists.

as for 5 and 6 we then get there the same way.

So, as is now obvious both arguments get to their beings existing as long as the being is possible.

Analyzing the 2 sides now:


Now we must determine which is actually possible or at least probable. If the theist were to prove the maximally great being as probable, they would have to argue that their being was more likely then "no maximality." If they wanted to completely prove their god, they would be best suited to use reductio ad absurdum that no maximality is absurd. Now, I am not sure that we can reduce either side to absurdity with our knowledge now. So, at best we can say that it is 50/50 which being exists. I would argue though that it is far less then that.

The no maximality, is less restrictive on possible universes and also requires less assumptions. Currently we don't know of any Maximally great beings, so assuming one is possible is one more assumption. Also it seems that a maximally great being would have a certain impact on universes that would restrict the possible universes. As the logical construct of Occam's razor says, all things being equal the idea that requires the least assumptions and is the least restrictive is preferred.

I would also argue that a maximally great being is pretty well defeated by the problem of evil, as long as you take the assumption that it would be greater to stop suffering, then it is to let it happen. There does not appear to be any logical inconsistency with stopping suffering. Therefore it appears to me, once we look at this, No maximality actually has a greater probability then a Maximally great being. Good Night ontological argument.